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CHARLES B. BUGGER,
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
WILMA R. BUGGER

I.

INTRODUCTION

Comes now the Plaintiff/Appellee, Wilma R. Bugger, by and
through her attorneys of record, W. Kevin Jackson and Douglas P.
Hoyt, and respectfully submits the following appellate brief in
this matter.
II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (i) (1994) . This is an appeal
by the Defendant from a Decree of Annulment (Entered Nunc Pro Tunc)
entered

by

the

Third

District

Court,

Judge

Tyrone

E.

Medley

presiding, on or about the 3rd day of June, 1994. No post judgment
motions were filed by either party.

A notice of appeal was filed

by the Defendant on or about the 30th day of June, 1994.
Plaintiff did not file a cross appeal.

The

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following four (4) issues are presented to this Court by
the Appellant Charles B. Bugger (hereinafter referred to as the
"Defendant"):
1.

Did the Third District court err, as a matter of Law, in

entering the June 3, 1994 Decree of Annulment, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law "Nunc Pro Tunc", and if so why?
2.

Did the Third District court err, as a matter of Law, in

setting aside Appellant's Amended Decree of Annulment, entered on
or about July 22, 1993?
3.

Did the Third District court err, as a factual finding,

in concluding there was "good cause" for a Decree of Annulment to
be entered Nunc Pro Tunc in this matter?
4.

Did the Third District court err, as a factual finding,

in concluding that the Respondent (sic) did not intentionally and
willfully disregard Judge Conder's ruling in the 1983 proceedings?
5.

The appeal also presents the issue of whether or not the

ruling by the Third District Court can be sustained on alternative
grounds?
IV.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW QN APPEAL

This court has defined the standard of review for an appeal
from a decree of divorce.

The standard of review that is used is

as follows: The Court of Appeals will not disturb the findings of
fact of the trial court unless a clear abuse of discretion is
shown.

Burnham v. Burnham. 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986), Greene v,

Greene. 751 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278
-2-

(Utah

1988) .

The Appellate

Court

will

therefore

give

great

deference to the factual findings of the Trial Court. Cummings v.
Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991).
Issues of law are reviewed by this Court under the correction
of error standard with no special deference being given to the
District Court! s rulings on the law.
(Utah App. 1990),

Smith v. Smith, 793 P. 2d 407

Cummings. 821 P.2d at 476.
V.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The determinative statute for purposes of this appeal is Utah
Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l

(1983).

This section reads as

follows:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of
good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered,
enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of
marriage.

VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case:

This appeal is made by reason of an action for an annulment of
a marriage between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

The Defendant

filed the action for an annulment in the Third District Court, for
Salt Lake County, on or about the 3rd day of August, 1982.

B.

The Course of Proceedings

On or about the 23rd day of October, 1981 the Plaintiff, Wilma
R. Bugger, filed a Verified Complaint for a divorce against the
Defendant, Charles Bugger.

The Defendant did not file an answer to

the Complaint and on the 7th day of December, 1981 a default was
taken against the Defendant.

A Decree of Divorce was thereafter
-3-

entered on the 25th day of May, 1982 by the Honorable Raymond S.
Uno.

Notice of the entry of the Decree was then sent to the

Defendants attorney of record, Horace J. Knowlton.
On or about the 3rd day of August, 1982 the Defendant filed,
with

the

clerk

Counterclaim.

of

the Third District

Court, an Answer and

The Defendant's Counterclaim requested the Court to

dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint and for the entry of a Decree of
Annulment.

A trial on the merits of the Defendant's Counterclaim

was thereafter held before the Honorable Dean E. Conder on the 19th
day of April, 1983.

At the conclusion of the trial Judge Conder

entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law and the final
judgment for the disposition of the property the parties acquired
during the course of the marriage.

The judge's findings and

conclusions and the judgment of the court were all made on the
record, a copy of the transcript of said record is attached hereto
as Exhibit "A".
The Plaintiff's attorney of record, Kenn Hanson, then prepared
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of
Annulment and submitted them to the Court for entry.

It appears

from the court's records that said findings and decree were never
entered by the court or filed by the clerk of the court.

Mr.

Hanson prepared an affidavit stating that he prepared the findings
and the decree and submitted them to the court for filing and
entry.

(R. 13 7-152) . A copy of Mr. Hanson's Affidavit is attached

hereto as Exhibit "B". This affidavit contains as attachments the
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
-4-

Law, as exhibits to the affidavit, as Mr. Hanson prepared them for
entry.

The Plaintiff cannot determine that they were lost or

misplaced by the clerk of the court.
In any event, the Plaintiff and the Defendant then went about
their separate lives for approximately ten (10) years.

Neither

party was aware that the Court's official record may have been
deficient.

During this period of time the parties acted as if the

findings and the decree had been signed and duly entered by the
court.

The Defendant never tried to execute or enforce the Decree

of Annulment entered by the Court until around the 19th day of
April, 1993.

The Defendant did nothing to compromise, settle or

have the Plaintiff comply with the Decree for exactly ten

(10)

years.
At this time the Defendant attempted to locate the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Annulment in the
Court files. When he discovered that the documents were not in the
file he prepared them himself and submitted them to the Court for
the Court's

signature.

(R. 47 and

51).

The Defendant

then

submitted to the court amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and an amended Decree of Divorce.

(R. 57 and 61). The Trial

Court, Judge Tyrone Medley now presiding, entered

the Amended

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Amended Decree of
Annulment on or about the 22nd day of July, 1993.

The Defendant

never gave the Plaintiff any notice of the submission of these new
or amended documents to the court and the subsequent entry of by
the court, as is evidenced by the lack of any type of certificate
-5-

of delivery attached to these pleadings. During the time that the
Defendant was preparing and submitting these amended pleadings the
Plaintiff was not a resident of the State of Utah and could not
have known that the documents were being submitted to the court.
She was serving a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints in New York State.

It was only on the Plaintiff ! s

return to the State of Utah that she learned the Defendant was
trying to execute on the judgment that was now over ten years old.
The Defendant next sought the issuance of an Order to Show
Cause

in the Trial

Court.

The Plaintiff

responded

with a

counterclaim against the Defendantf s Order to Show Cause claiming
offsets for amounts the Plaintiff paid towards debts Judge Conder
ordered the Defendant to pay under the Decree of Annulment.

A

hearing on the Defendant's Order to Show Cause and the Plaintiff's
counterclaim was held on the 19th day of April, 1994.

The issue

presented to the District Court by the Defendant pursuant to the
Order to Show Cause was why the Plaintiff had not paid the
Defendant the sum of money the Defendant claims was awarded him by
the Court at the time of the hearing held in 1983. At the hearing
on the Order to Show Cause Judge Medley found that the Plaintiff
had not been given proper or sufficient notice of the filing and
the entry of the amended findings and decree.

Judge Medley then

set the amended findings and decree aside. The court then preceded
to hear the Defendant's Order to Show Cause.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Order to Show Cause
Judge Medley found that good cause existed for the entry of the
-6-

Findings

of

Annulment.

Fact

and

Conclusions

of Law and

the Decree of

This finding was based upon Judge Conder made the

decisions on the items in question ten years prior to the hearing.
Judge Medley found that the transcript of the 1983 trial "clearly
bears this out."

(R. 260-61).

Judge Medley further found that

both parties were barred from their respective claims by the
equitable doctrine of Laches for failing to pursue these claims
until ten (10) years after the court granted the annulment.

(R.

261) .
The Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and has timely
filed a brief with this court.
VII.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Plaintiff was married to Dale L. Alexander.

parties were divorced on January 21, 1946.

The

The divorce was to

become absolute and final six (6) months after the entry of the
Decree of Divorce.
2.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married on June 10,

1946 in Las Vegas, Nevada.

At the time of this marriage the

Plaintifffs divorce had not yet become absolute.
3.

The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for a divorce on or

about the 23rd day of October, 1981.
4.

(R. 2)

The Defendant did not timely answer the Plaintiff's

Complaint for a divorce and a default was taken against the
Defendant on or about the 7th day of December, 1981.

-7-

(R. 7)

5.

On or about the 3rd day of August, 1982 the Defendant

finally answered the Plaintiff's complaint and counterclaimed for
an annulment of the marriage.
6.

(R. 24)

On the 19th day of April, 1983 a trial was scheduled to

be held before the Honorable Dean D. Conder.

Judge Conder granted

the Defendant's claim for an annulment and made a division of the
joint assets held by the parties.

At time of the trial Judge

Conder considered the evidence presented to him as the basis for
the property division.
7.

The

Plaintiff's

attorney,

Kenn

Hanson,

prepared

the

original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of
Annulment.

(R. 137-152).

He then presented the documents to the

court for the court's signature and for filing of record by the
clerk of the court.

For an unknown reason the documents were never

placed in the file along with the other pleadings in this case.
8.

After approximately ten (10) years later the Defendant

attempted to enforce the Decree and to collect on the judgment.

At

no time prior to this date did the Defendant try to determine the
contents of the court's file.
9.

(R. 74)

When the Defendant learned that the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Annulment were not in the
court's file, he prepared and submitted a proposed Decree and
proposed findings for the court's signature.
10.

After

having

obtained

the

judge's

(R. 74)
signature

on

the

proposed decree and the proposed findings the Defendant prepared
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended
-8-

Decree of Annulment and had the court sign these documents. (R. 5763) .
11.

The Defendant never gave the Plaintiff any notice that he

was submitting any of these pleadings to the clerk of the court for
subsequent entry. None of these documents include a certificate of
service.

No certificate of service was file with the court.

12.

After

entry of

the amended

Decree

of Annulment

the

Defendant then brought an Order to Show Cause against the Plaintiff
trying to enforce the Amended Decree of Annulment and seeking
payment of the judgment in the sum of approximately $11,562.00.
(R. 64) .
13.

The

trial

court

held

an evidentiary

hearing

on

the

Defendants Order to Show Cause on the 19th day of April, 1994.
(R. 112).
14.
Amended

At the hearing Judge Medley set aside the Defendant's
Findings

Plaintiff

and Amended

of Annulment

had not been given proper notice

submitted the documents.
15.

Decree

because

the

the Defendant

had

(R. 183).

Judge Medley also found that no Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law nor a Decree of Annulment were ever entered of
record in the case.
16.

(R. 180).

Judge Medley found, at the conclusion of the hearing,

that the Plaintiff did not intentionally disregard the orders of
the court as they were stated on the record by Judge Conder during
the 1993 trail.

(R. 261).

-9-

17.

Judge Medley found that good cause existed for the entry

of the Findings and Decree nunc pro tunc.

The judge based the good

cause on the fact that Judge Conder had made decisions on the
record of the issues presented during the 1983 hearing.

He made

this finding based upon the transcript of the 1983 trial which was
provided by the Defendant.
18.

(R. 260-261).

Judge Medley was not persuaded that there was sufficient

evidence presented that would sustain the Defendant's Order to Show
Cause.

The judge then struck the Order to Show Cause.

19.

(R. 262) .

Judge Medley further found that both the Plaintiff and

the Defendant were lacking in credibility as witnesses to varying
degrees.
20.

(R. 262-263).
Judge Medley found that both parties were barred from

pursuing their respective claims by the legal doctrine of laches.
(R. 261 and 263).
21.

With these findings by the Court, which were made on the

record at the April 19, 1994 hearing, Judge Medley dismissed each
party's claims against the other party. (R. 260-263)
22.

The Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal and has filed

his brief in the matter.
VIII.
1.

(R. 162).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Trial Court did not err in entering the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Annulment nunc pro
tunc.

"At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed a court to correct its

earlier error or supply its omission so the record

accurately

reflected that which in fact had taken place." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw.
-10-

788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990).

Plaintiff's former attorney of

record had prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
the Decree of Annulment and submitted the documents for entry, for
an unknown reason the documents were never entered by the clerk or
were lost after execution.

Therefore, the Trial Court was not in

error when it ordered the Findings and the Decree entered nunc pro
tunc.
2.

The Trial Court did not err when it set aside the

Defendant's Amended Decree of Annulment and the Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Plaintiff was not given notice of
the entry of these documents by the Defendant when the Defendant
presented the documents for entry.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

58A(d) requires a party to promptly give notice of the signing or
entry of judgment to all other parties and to file proof of service
of such notice with the court.

The Defendant gave no such notice

to the Plaintiff of the signing of the documents by Judge Medley
nor did he file any proof of the giving of the notice with the
clerk of the court. Judge Medley properly set aside the Decree for
the

Defendant's

failure

to

follow

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.
3.

Judge Medley did not err when he found that there was

good cause for entering the Decree of Annulment and the Findings of
Fact nunc pro tunc.

The Appeals Court will not reverse a Trial

Court's determination of facts if the ruling is correctly based
upon a proper ground. Peterson v. Peterson, 645 P. 2d 3 7 (Utah App.
1991).

In this case Judge Medley based his finding of good cause
-11-

on the fact that Judge Conder had made a judgment on the record at
the 1983 trial on the merits.
4.

The Trial Court did not err in finding that the Plaintiff

did not intentionally and willfully disregard Judge Conder's ruling
in the 1983 trial.

The judge at the trial level is better able to

determine the credibility of a witness.

The Court of Appeals

should assume that the Trial Court believed the evidence which
supports the findings.
287

(1967) .

Judge

Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802, 20 Utah 2d

Medley

found

that

the

Plaintiff

did

not

intentionally disregard the 1983 order.

VIII.

ARGUMENT

A. The Trial Court did not abuse its description
when it entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
o£ Law and the Decree o£ Annulment
nunc pro tunc.
The Trial Court may "enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter
relating to marriage . . . or annulment of marriage" upon the Court
finding that good cause exists.

See UCA §30-4a-l.

This Court has

stated that " ' good cause' must be determined on a case by case
basis, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, as equity
and justice require."

H o m e v. H o m e , 737 P. 2d 244

(Utah App.

1987) . The Trial Court found the necessary good cause for entering
the

Decree

and

the

Findings

nunc

pro

tunc.

Judge

Medley

specifically stated that he believed good cause existed "because
Judge Conder actually made the decisions on these issues some ten
years ago and I think the transcript clearly bears this out."
260-261).

(R.

The affidavit of Mr. Hanson also substantiates the fact

that the pleadings were prepared and actually submitted to the
-12-

Court.

What happens thereafter to the pleadings is beyond the

control of the Plaintiff.
The finding of good cause by the Trial Court is specific and
spells out what the facts are in the case which give rise to the
entry of the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc.

The Trial

Court's factual finding needs to be given great deference by this
court.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

states

that

they

accord

"considerable deference to findings and judgment of the trial court
due to its advantageous position."

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d

1218 (Utah 1980) .
Judge Medley was able to review the case at length, make
factual findings based upon the evidence presented to the court,
listen to testimony by both parties and to make a determination
about the credibility of the parties during and at the conclusion
of the 1994 hearing. His determination was that good cause existed
to allow him to enter the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc.
This Court should give this decision the same deference to this
finding.
The Defendant argues in his brief that the facts are not
sufficient to support Judge Medley1s decision.

This argument

cannot be upheld in light of the evidence of the case.

The

Defendant argues that it was the Plaintiff's responsibility to
prepare the original Decree of Annulment and the original Findings
of Fact, through the work of Mr. Hanson. The Defendant goes on to
argue that it is "undisputed that Judge Conder never signed the
final Decree of Annulment because it was never submitted for his
-13-

review."

(Appellant's Brief at p. 13) . The pleadings filed by the

Plaintiff and the evidence presented show that this statement is
inaccurate.

Mr. Hanson filed an affidavit with the court in which

he states "As the Plaintiff's Attorney of record I prepared the
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as required by the Court and to forward them to the Court for
entry."

(R. 138).

The Plaintiff has supported her position that her attorney had
properly followed through with the court's order from the 1983
trial.

The Defendant's contention that good cause does not exist

is unsupported by the facts and the pleadings prepared in this
case.

The Trial Court found "good cause" and this finding should

be upheld by this Court.
The Defendant next argues that even if there is good cause for
entering the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc the documents
are not consistent with the 1983 ruling.

This argument is moot.

The defendant had the opportunity to object to the Decree and the
Findings as they were prepared.

The Decree and Findings were

mailed to the Defendant's attorney of record David Brown on the
10th day of May, 1994.

Judge Medley entered the Decree and signed

the Findings on the 3rd day of June, 1994.

The Defendant had

notice and ample opportunity to object to the form of the Decree
and the Findings.

The Defendant, either by counsel or personally,

did not object to the form when the documents were entered.

The

Defendant should not now be heard to complain that the documents
are inaccurate even though he did not object to the documents when
-14-

they were presented to him.

This Court should not entertain this

issue when it was not raised at the trial court level where it
could have been properly addressed.
Next,

the

Defendant

argues

that

the

Plaintiff

disobeyed Judge Conderfs order from the 1983 trial.

willfully

The Defendant

argues that the facts are undisputed that the Plaintiff "knowingly,
intentionally, and wrongfully" disobeyed the order of the Trial
Court.

(Appellantfs Brief p. 14 and 15).

This contention is

against the factual findings of Judge Medley made at the conclusion
of the hearing on Defendant!s Order to Show Cause.

Judge Medley

specifically stated that "this Court is far from persuaded by the
evidence

that

the

plaintiff

in

this

case

intentionally

and

willfully attempted to disregard Judge Conder's ruling in this
particular case."

(R. 261, emphasis added).

The Defendant has the responsibility of showing this Court
that the Trial Court's finding is clearly wrong and against the
weight of the evidence.

The Defendant must marshall "all evidence

relevant to the finding and then shows the finding to be clearly
erroneous."

Barber v. Barber. 792 P.2d

134

(Utah App. 1990).

Defendant does not provide this Court with any evidence, either in
the record or now, which even hints that Judge Medley 1 s finding
would be an abuse of discretion.

This Court must therefore presume

that Judge Medley's findings are correct and in accord with the
weight of the evidence as presented to the Court at the hearing.

-15-

B. The Plaintiff's personal and first-hand knowledge
of Judge Conder's ruling in 1983 does NOT give the

Plaintiff actual knowledge and notice of the
Defendant's preparation and filing of a proposed
Decree of Annulment and proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law,
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff received "fair and
sufficient notice, was given ample opportunity to be heard, and to
prepare
Wilma

for the defense of her person, position and property.
is

therefore

charged

with

'actual'

notice

of

that

proceeding's judgment and there is no due process violation based
upon

the

entry

of

that

judgment

(Appellant's brief p. 16 and 17).

without

notice

in

1993."

The Defendant relies upon a

Montana State Supreme Court decision to say that the Plaintiff had
constructive notice simply because she is a party to the case.
This argument is clearly against the Rules of Civil Procedure
of the State of Utah.

Rule 58A(d) requires a party to give "prompt

notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the
court."

The Defendant did not give the Plaintiff any notice that

he had prepared a proposed Decree and proposed Findings when he
filed and had the Court enter the documents.

The Defendant then

prepared a proposed Amended Decree and Amended Findings.

Again,

the Defendant did not provide the Plaintiff with notice of the
filing and the entry of these pleadings or decree.
The Plaintiff was not allowed an opportunity to be heard by
the Court when the documents were entered since she did not have
any knowledge of the Defendant's actions.

The Plaintiff rights to

defend and to be heard were violated by the Defendant's failure to
-16-

follow the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The rules were adopted so

that parties are given notice of the status of the case.

Wilma

believed that Mr. Hanson had prepared and filed the Decree of
Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law some ten
(10) years earlier.

Both of the parties acted under the belief

that if the Decree had been entered for those ten years.

The

Plaintiff

the

cannot

be

charged

with

"actual

Defendant's actions ten years after the fact.

knowledge"

of

The Trial Court

properly set aside the Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law which had been entered without notice to the
Plaintiff.

Judge Medley found that the Plaintiff did not have

actual knowledge of the entry of the Decree and the Findings the
Defendant filed with the court.

(R. 183) . Again, if the Defendant

wants this Court to overturn the findings of the Trial Court he
must marshall all the evidence that shows the Trial Court's factual
error.

The Defendant makes an assertion that the Trial Court was

wrong but does not offer any new evidence or any evidence from the
record to show the findings are clearly wrong.
Judge Medley found the Defendant had violated the Plaintiff's
due process rights by not giving the Plaintiff notice of the filing
and entry of the Decree and Findings and the Amended Decree and
Amended Findings. Judge Medley acted properly by setting aside the
Decree and the Findings.
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C. The Defendant's argument that the Lower Court
erroneously set aside the 1993 Amended Decree of Annulment
is moot in light of the Findings of the lower Court.
The Defendant

argues that the Amended Decree and Amended

findings should not have been set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous.

While this argument would be proper in most cases it is

moot in this case. Judge Medley found that a due process violation
occurred and set aside the Amended Decree and Amended Findings
because of this violation.

The Defendant's argument is without

merit based upon the facts of the case and the specific finding of
Judge Medley.
D.

Judge Medley applied the equitable doctrine of

Laches to both parties claimsf
Judge

Medley,

at

the

conclusion

of

the

1994

evidentiary

hearing on the Defendant's Order to Show Cause, found that the
Defendant AND the Plaintiff had waited too long in bringing their
actions before the Court.

He therefore barred each party's claims

due to the parties' failure to act when they properly should have
acted.
The Defendant waited for ten (10) years before he tried to
collect on the judgment.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-22

specifically states that a person has eight years to bring an
action upon a judgment or decree.
to enforce the judgment ten
entered by Judge Conder.

The Defendant brought an action

(10) years after the judgment was

Judge Medley found that Judge Conder had

made findings and entered a judgment at the 1983 trial. As part of
the 1994 hearing, Judge Medley also found that the Defendant made
an unbelievable witness.
-18-

The Defendant

should have brought

an action within the

specified time limit if he wanted to collect on the judgment.

He

did not and the Defendant cannot and should not be heard to
complain due to his failure to act when he should have acted.
Neither party should be allowed ten (10) years to prepare pleadings
which hey want to have enforced.
Judge Medley also found the Plaintiff was barred from her
counterclaim to the Order to Show Cause because she had waited for
too long to bring the counterclaim.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Trial Court acted properly when it entered the Decree of
Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law nunc pro
tunc.

The Court found that Judge Conder had made findings about

the issues presented by the Defendant in his Order to Show Cause.
If the Defendant had wanted to collect on the judgment of Judge
Conder he knew where the courthouse was to check to make sure the
Decree had been entered.

The Defendant also had an attorney he

could have checked with to determine if the Decree had been
entered.

However, the Defendant did nothing for ten (10) years.

When the Defendant acted he did so without notice to the
Plaintiff. The Defendants actions violated the Plaintiff!s rights
to be heard and to defend herself before the court.

Judge Medley

found that the Plaintiff had not been given notice and he properly
set aside the Amended Decree and Amended Findings which were filed
by the Defendant.
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The Court did not make any factual errors or legal errors in
the entry of the Decree of Annulment nunc pro tunc and the Findings
of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

nunc

pro

tunc.

It

is

the

Defendant's responsibility to marshall the evidence to support the
contentions of the Trial Court's errors.

The Defendant has failed

to present any new evidence or show from the record any errors the
Trial Court committed.
The Trial Court' s Findings of Fact should be sustained by this
Court.

The Conclusions of Law by the Trial

Court

should

be

reviewed and found to be correct in accordance with the findings of
the Trial Court.

The appeal of the Defendant should therefore be

dismissed.
DATED this l7Hf

day of April, 1995.

w
T
^
./
Attorney
£&ry Appellee/Plaintiff

^ ^ ,&&<&T~

Douglas P.' Hoyt/
Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appellee's Brief to the following:
Gary L. Bell
124 South 400 East, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
this /7fh
day of April, 1995.
^ t ^ ^ ^
BUGG-APP.BRF
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PLAINTIFF1S EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT "A"

CERTIFICATE
1
2

STATS OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT IAKE )

)

as.

4
5
6

X, Hal-M. Walton, do hereby c e r t i f y that I am

7

a c e r t i f i e d Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on

8 April 19, 1983 I appeared before the above-named Court and
9

reported in Stenotype the order herein attached consisting

10

of ten pages.

11

of my shorthanc**notes as transcribed by me.

That the same i s a true and correct rendition

12
13
14
15

&i

H.M. Walton C.S.R.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

C f£

Dated: March 21st, 1992

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATEnQFrtUTAH

i

OOOOQOQOOOOOOOO

2
WILMA R. BUGGER,

3 I

Plaintiff,

4

D-81-4371

5

v.

6 I

:

7 I

J U D G E '

S_

O R D E R

CHARLES B. BUGGER,
Defendant.

8'

10

BE IT REMEMBERED, t h a t t h e a b o v e - c a p t i o n e d c a u s e of

H

a c t i o n came on r e g u l a r l y f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HONORABLE

12

DEAN E". CONDER, one d f t h e Judges o f t h e above-named Court on

13

A p r i l 19th, 1983.

14

A

P P E A R A N C E S

15
16

J For t h e P l a i n t i f f :

17

MR. KENN M.HANSEN
A t t o r n e y A t Law ,
740 E. 3900 S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utat

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

For t h e D e f e n d a n t :

MR. HORACE J . KNOWLTON
A t t o r n e y At Law
2 14 Tenth Avenue
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a i

1

THE COURT:

It's the Judgement of this Court that

2

the parties be granted a Decree of Anullment;and I think that]

3

the law provides that whatever property has been acquired by

4

the parties during their marriage should be equally divided

5

between them.

6

-shiprand as much as possible should share in the profits an4

7

share in the losses.

8
9
10
11

And it's my feeling that marriage is a partned

I find that there is an equity in the home of thirty-Jthree-thousand-six hundred-thirty dollars.

Going to award

the home to the Plaintiff herein*
I find that there is an equity in the Duchesne lot oif

12

five-hundred-fifty dollars, because that's what you say you

13

took it in for;and I'll award that to you so that you can

14

find it and have whatever value there is for thatr

15

MR* BUGGER:-

16

THE COURT:

If you can find it.
— i n the mobile trailer home, I find

17

that there is a present value equity of $7000;and going to

18

award that to the Defendant*

19

award to the Plaintiff.

20

there was there you say is yours;so you're obligated for

21

whatever obligations there are arising out of it and I'll

22

award to you whatever tools of the trade and equipment there

23

may be that were yours for use;and you're entitled to get

24

them; if the Plaintiff has any of them, order that she turn

25

them over to the Defendant, including the tool press, bench

Furniture and fixtures I'll

The siding company, sir, whatever

1
2

saw, ladder and wheel barrow.
Since apparently neither side "is certain that there

3

is a diamond ring, it's whereabouts, not going to make any

4

specific order on that unless it's determined where it is. I

5

don't know where it is*

6

Plaintiff/ and as I figure it, that gives to the Plaintiff in

7

assets, $38,630.

1975 Cadillac going to award to the

8

Since the Defendant has sold the truck, the Plymouth,

9

LeMans, I'll award him the proceeds of those sales;the.:thous-

10

-and dollars on the truck, the fifty dollars on the Plymouth

11

fifty dollars on the LeMansrvalue of the tools at $1,700,and

12

that comes to $10,350, including the mobile home and the Duch

13

-esne lot.

I think that the-obligation on the property of th

14 marriage certainly ought to be shared up until the time the
15

parties split up?and so 1 am going to order that the payment

16

to Sears of $432 be split between the parties, Dr. Barnes is

17

to be split*

Don't have a figure on that.

18

MR. HANSEN:

19

THE COURT;-

Fifty dollars, Your Honor.
Fifty dollars? All right. The mobill^

20

home, the $1,500 paid by the Plaintiff on that, to be split

21

between the parties. The $744 to be split between the parties

22

And the IRS lien, because the only evidence I have before-me

23 I is apparently those .were obligations incurred during the marr
24

-iage when both of you are working?and I can't identify as

25

being the obligation ol one person only. And so if I add

t h o s e figures t o g e t h e r , that leaves one item that I

1

2 have not included h e r e ; I have some d i f f i c u l t y trying t o figure)
3

out what i t is;and t h a t ' s the equity in the uniform r e a l

4

estate contract.

5

times $ 7 9 . which means t h a t there i s $8,532 y e t t o be paid on

6

that.

I t has nine years t o go, for 12 months,

But that would have to be discounted t o i t ' s current

7 v a l u e ; i n nine years, t h e i n t e r e s t would equal the p r i n c i p a l .
8

Going t o s e t the f i g u r e on that of $6000;just having t o do i t

9

arbitrarily.

10

If I put $6000 on t h a t and award that t o the

Defendant, the two p a r t i e s then come out approximately equal.

n Nineteen-thousand-three-huridred-fifteen d o l l a r s t o the P l a i n 12

t i f f ;nineteen-thousand-eighte*»

d o l l a r s t o the Defendant.

13 jAnd I think t h a t ' s as near as I can d i v i d e the a s s e t s .

MR. HANSEN:

14

One point, of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , Your

15

Eonor.

16

- i n g then that the award of the residence t o the P l a i n t i f f

17

would incorporate

18

o b l i g a t i o n thereunder.

19

And now t h a t I g e t your bottom figure he're;I am assum-J-

the underlying f i r s t and second mortgage

THE COURT:

I have taken, using $33;630 and value

20

of t h e property and $5000 for the C a d i l l a c , makes a t o t a l of

21

thixty-eight-thousand-six-hundred-thirty d o l l a r s .

I really

22

g i v e no value t o furniture and f i x t u r e s , because

they're

23

v a l u a b l e t o tie person that has them, but c a n ' t s e l l them for

24

f i f t y bucks, a hundred bucks, whatever.

25

MR. HANSEN:

It would be, Your Honor, for my own

1

c l a r i f i c a t i o n then t h a t the award of t h e rea property, |

2

t h a t ' s t h e Kearns property t o the P l a i n t i f f

3

assuming both underlying o b l i g a t i o n s .

4

THE COURT:

Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t .

is' s u b A C t i;o her!

Cadillac,

fyrnit-

5

-ure and f i x t u r e s in the home would only be $6000.

6

i f i d i v i d e that by two, g i v e him t h e Duchesne l o t , mobile

1

home and the truck, and the Plymouth, LeMans, t h e t o o l s , u n i -

8

-form r e a l e s t a t e contract and one half the d e b t s t h a t have

9

been paid by her;and t h a t comes out t o h i s share $ 1 9 , 0 1 8 . I

10
11
12
13

t h i n k t h a t d i f f e r e n c e i s t o o miniscule t o bo t h e r w i t h .
MR. BUGGER:

How am I goin' t o c o l l e c t on the

t o o l s when there a i n ' t any?
THE COURT:

They -sold 'em a l l .

Sorry, c a n ' t answer t h a t q u e s t i o n .

14

Didn't create this s i t u a t i o n .

15

I have g o t .

16

$19*315,

MR KNCWLTON:

Doing t the b e s t I can with what

Your Honor h a s a w a r d e d , a s I under

"17

- s t a n d , t h e home out a t Kearns together with t h e f u r n i t u r e

IS

t h e r e contained, t o t h e P l a i n t i f f ; a n d t h a t , as I heard Your

!9

Honor, was approximately $38,000

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. KNCWLTON:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Uh-huh and the C a d i l l a c .
That would be $ 4 3 , 0 0 0 .
N o , $ 3 3 , 6 3 5 f o r t h e home, $ 5 0 0 0 f o r

t h e C a d i l l a c makes $ 3 8 , 6 3 0 .
MR. KNOWLTCN:

My question i s , you s a i d $19,000

t o the one;$19,000 t o the o t h e r .

How can we g e t $38,000 out

'

of $19,000 i t seems t o me that under Your Honor's rule]

2

3

right.

THE COURT:

Wait a minute, you: u re r i g h t .

You're r i g h t .

Wait a minute;got t o make another c a l f

4

- c u l a t i o n here.

5

that he g e t s .

6

got t o subtract t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h o s e two.

7

another $4,311 i n e q u i t y in the value of t h e home.

8
9

You're r i g h t .

You're

I now come up with $19,018

And a s s e t s , she gets t h i r t y - e i g h t .

What I am doing i s taking $38,630

So I ' v e
Yes, he h^s

as the d i s t r i b u t - j

- i o n t o Mrs. whatever—the d i s t r i b u t i o n t o the Defendant.

10

come out with $ 1 9 , 0 1 8 .

11

MR. KNOWLTQN:

12

THE COURT:

I|

Yes, s i r .
And that includes h a l f of t h e b i l l s

13

that were incurred a f t e r the separation, except for t h e mort]

14

-gage payments;I think t h a t inures t o her b e n e f i t because

15

she has l i v e d in t h e home during that time;and s o I add thosfe

16

together and I come out with $19,018;and for him.

17

i f i subtract the $19,000 from the $ 3 8 , 6 3 0 , t h a t l e a v e s me

18

eight-thousand-six-hundred-seventy -two d o l l a r s more t h a t

19

s h e ' s g e t t i n g than h e .

20

that would be $4,311 t o him t o even o u t .

21

even.

22

And $38,6p0

And i f you d i v i d e t h a t between them,
So they come out

You follow me?
MR. KN0WLTON:

I don't b e l i e v e I do, Your Honor.

23

Thirty-eight-thousand would be the e q u i t y t h a t she would be

24

receiving.

25

THE COURT:

That's r i g h t .

1 I

MR. KNOWLTON:

2

THE COURT:

And t h e $19,000 from $ 3 8 , 0 0 0 i s
Maybe my f i g u r e s are wrong*

3

use my c a l c u l a t o r on t h a t o n e .

4

I am in t r o u b l e .

5
6

MR. KNOWLTON:

Didn't

I f I don't use my c a l c u l a t o r

D i f f e r e n c e would be 1 7 , 0 0 0 .

Half

of 1 7 , 0 0 0 .

7

THE COURT:

19,652, the difference, so I am in

8

error. $19,652

9

means $9,826 equity in the home that the Defendant should

10

13

Divide that by two and that

have.

H
12

difference.

Now, Mr. Hansen, have you followed my figures, I
bope?
MR.HANSEN:

Well, Your Honor, I think so.

If I

14

can recap concerning the Plaintiffs'' position I have got.

15

The Defendant's position we have taken $550 equity on the

1g

Duchesne lot.

17

THE COURT:

Give them to you. Duchesne lot, $550j

18

mobile home, $7000, truck that was sold, $1000, '48 Plymouth

19

fifty dollars, '65 LeMans, $50. tools, $i;700r balance on un-\

20

-iform real estate contract, $6000.

21

guestimate of what that would be.

22

MR. HANSEN:

23

THE COURT:

Trying to take my best

615350.
She has paid in obligations the IRS,

24 $2650, $423 to somebody—I don't remember who it is, $1,500,
25

$744, which comes out to $5,367 and charge him with half of

that is $26,83.50.
2
3

MR. HANSEN:

Ok.

So I add to his the 2683.
Come within a few dollars o"f

that that arrives at his equity figure then,.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. HANSEN:

Ok.
From the Plaintiff $38,630, Your

6

Honor, that incorporates or encompasses the half of the bills

7

she has paid;I assumed, in other words the other 2683 that is

8

in there.

9

1°

THE COURT:
e q u i t y of the p l a c e .

" I for whatever
12

17
18

MR. KN0WLTON:

25

To make i t e q u i t a b l e . Your Honor,

would be w i l l i n g t o o f f e r her t h e switch and g i v e her $10,000
from t h e s a l e of the home, t h a t i s .
MR. HANSEN:
MR. MIOWLTON:

I don.'t know that t h a t
Give her everything that t h e y ' v e

o f f e r e d her and $10,000 for t h e s a l e of the home.

22

24

she

s o t h a t Your Honor w i l l understand our t h i n k i n g , I think we

20

23

All right.

would s t i l l ewe him $ 9 , 6 2 0 as a l i e n on the home.

19

21

i t i s , I considered that comparable t o the rent}-

Now, that means t h a t on t h i s kind of a division

15
16

She has t h e advantage of l i v i n g t h e r e

- t i n g of the place during t h e same period a t i m e .

13
14

Taking t h e current balance on the

THE COURT:
you want.
now.

W e l l , you can work t h a t out any way

But my c a l c u l a t i o n s have gone as far as I can r i g h t

Now, I think t h a t w i t h t h e residence and the home t h a t ' s

there, there ought to be a reasonable period t o try t o s e l l i t

or pay the Defendant his equity.
2

How much time do

you think that would be, Mr. Hans en?

3

MR. KNOWLTON:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. HANSEN:

Thirty days.
Oh no. Spring.

Mr. Hansen?

Your Honor, if I can have just a

6

moment to digest a little bit of this and consult with my cli

7

-ent, if I may?

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. HANSEN:

Give you thirty seconds.
Your Honor, we would ask the Court

10 that under the circumstances that we haverwe're in April,now
11

that is the 4th month;that we have 180 days to come up with

12 the money to satisfy that lien.
13

THE COURT:

14

MR. KNOWLTON:

Mr. Knowlton, what would you suggest?
Your Honor, calling the attention

15

of the Court to the fact that this is April, we're about to g

16

into May.

17

In our area the selling time is May and October.

We think, Your Hqnor, sixty days would be just right

18 And we think Your Honor should give some thought to whether ojf
19
20
21

not there shouldn't be any
THE COURT:

Ok. Here is what I am going to do.

I am going to order that the Plaintiff have six months in

22 which to sell and pay to the Defendant the $9,826. The reasofi
23

I am doing it that way is because I am giving the Defendant

24

the income off from the uniform real estate contract;and that

25

if it is not sold within six months or the Defendant is paid

out and I don't care whether you s e l l i t or pay him the]
$ 9 , 8 2 6 ; t h a t the ammount w i l l then accrue i n t e r e s t a t t h e
l e g a l r a t e , which i s now 12 %.

And the Court w i l l order the]

property l i s t e d for s a l e by m u l t i p l e l i s t i n g r e a l e s t a t e
agency and s o l d for the best p r i c e .

And t h a t a f t e r

that

d a t e , s i x months from t h e date I s i g n the Order on t h i s ,

it

would accrue i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of the l e g a l r a t e of inter]
-est.

Not going t o award attorneys f e e s .

are c a l l e d for under the Anullment S t a t u t e .
t o yoi

Don't t h i n k they
Ok.

Good luck

ahe Court w i l l be in r e c e s s .
(WHEREUPON .tnis nearing was concluded.)

10

EXHIBIT "B"

W. KEVIN JACKSON (1640)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379
Telephone: (801) 531-6600
Facsimile: (801) 521-3731

C* *?"* !

Uk5

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
WILMA R. BUGGER
AFFIDAVIT OF KENN M. HANSON,
ESQ.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. D81-4371

CHARLES B. BUGGER

Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

Commissioner Judith Atherton
oooOooo

STATE OF ARIZONA
COUNTY OF MOHAVE

)
:
)

ss.

Affiant first being duly sworn upon oath disposes and says as
follows:
1.

I was the Attorney of Record in the above entitled case

during the pendency of the Complaint for Divorce and the Complaint
for Annulment entered in the above entitled case.
2.

I represened the Plaintiff, Wilma R. Bugger in the above

entitled case on the issures raised in the various pleadings.
3.

I am familiar with the records and the pleadings in this

case as filed with the Clerk of the Court.
4.

I have personal knowledge concerning the facts setforth

in this affidavit and the facts of the case during the time that I
was the Attorney for the Plaintiff, Wilma R. Bugger.

00137

5.

If I am called to testify at trial my testimony would be

as setforth herein.
6.

That on or shortly after the 19th day of April, 1983, the

above entitled Court entered a Decree of Annulment by and between
the parties which became final and which has not been subjuct to
any appeal by any party.
7.

As the Plaintiff's Attorney of record I prepared the

Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as required by the Court and to forward them to the Court for
entry.
8.

It was, and still is, my practice to timely prepare all

Orders of the Court which I am required to prepare.
9.

It was, and still is, my practice to submit to the Court

all Orders when I have completed the Order and have had the
opposing Counsel approve the Order as to form.
10.

It was, and still is, my practice to follow up on any

matter I submit for entry to the Court to ensure that the Court
enters said Decree.
11.

That to the best of my knowledge I followed my usual

business custom and practice and submitted the Decree of Annulment
and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A copy of each is
attached as Exhibit "A" and "B" and incorporated by this reference.
12.

That had I known or reason to believe that the Decree of

Annulment had not been entered by the Court after submission I
would have again resubmitted the Decree of Annulment to be certain
that the Decree was properly entered.
-2-
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Further Affiant sayeth not.
DATED this

//

day of'March, 19 94

Kenn M. Ha
Attorney

VERIFICATION
STATE OF ARIZONA
ss.

COUNTY OF MOHAVE

)

I, the undersigned individual being first duly sworn under
oath, deposes and says that:
I am the person described in the attached document, and have
read said document in its entirety.
That the allegations made in said document are, to the best of
my knowledge and belief, true and accurate representations,
allegations and statements.
That the information supplied in said document is done so in
good faith and is based on personal knowledge or belief.
Dated this

''

day of-March, 1994.

UNDERSIGN!
1994

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on this //<£$£ day of

efa^tftrt*
Notary Public
Residing at:

^CU^Az^

•

OPHOM. SEAL

My commission expires:

VIRGINIA W.WELLONG
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Notay Pubic-Slate of Arizona
MOHAVE COUNTY
My C a m Expiree Jsn.7,1995
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to the following:
David W. Brown, Esq.
Boston Building, Suite 1120
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
this }2±L~ day of April, 1994.

BUGGHATT.AFF

-4ts<\
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PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

KENN M. HANSON of and for
CONDER, HANSON, WANGSGARD & BULLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

WILMA R. BUGGER,
>

DECREE OF ANNULMENT

i

Civil No. D-81-4371

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHARLES B. BUGGER,
Defendant.

Trial on this matter came on for its regularly scheduled
time on the 19th day of April/ 1983, before the Honorable Dean
Conder, District Court Judge.

Plaintiff appeared personally and

through her attorney, Kenn M. Hanson; Defendant appeared personally
and through his attorney, Horace Knowlton.

The Court heard and

considered the parties1 testimony as proffered by their attorneys
and further considered the evidence, and being fully advised in
the premises

and

good

cause

appearing

thereonf

the

Court

now

makes and enters the following
DECREE
1.

Defendant is granted a Decree of Annulment declaring

the parties narriage void ab initio.
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2.

The real property located at 4098 W. 5500 Southf

Kearns, Utah, is awarded to Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff assuming
and paying the underlying

1st and 2nd mortgages thereon, and,

further, subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendant in
the amount of $9,796.00.
3.

Plaintiff

shall pay

to

Defendant

the equitable

lien as follows:
a.

Plaintiff shall have 18 0 days from entry of the

Decree to pay to Defendant the amount of $9,796.00.
b.

In

the event

Plaintiff

has

not

paid

Defendant

$9,796.00 upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the
Decree, said amount of Defendant's lien shall accrue interest on
the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid.
c.

Further, upon the expiration of 18 0 days from the

entry of the Decree and

in the event Plaintiff has not paid

Defendant the amount of Defendant's lien, the above-referenced
real property shall be listed for sale through a multiple listing
agency and sold for the best price.
4.

Defendant

is awarded

as

his

sole

and separate

property the cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah, subject
to any and all underlying obligations thereon.
5.

Defendant

is

awarded

as

his

sole

and separate

property the 12f x 60' mobile home subject to any and all underlying obligations thereon.
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6.

Defendant

is

awarded

as

his

sole

arid

separate

property the proceeds of a\jJniform Real Estate Contract ^mounting
to $79.11 per month until said payments terminate according to
the terms and provisions of said contract.
7.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

as

her

sole

and

separate

property the fixtures, furniture and personalty located within
the real property at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah.
8.

Defendant

Plaintiff harmless

from

is ordered to assume and pay, holding
any

liability

thereon,

the debts and

obligations arising from Defendant's company known as B&B Siding
Co., listed as follows:
a.

Century Finance

b.

Valley Bank & Trust */fr/Pp.^

c.

VISA

9. - Defendant

^jod-

O-fA.
is

awarded

as

his

sole

and

separate

property the proceeds from the sale or une following automobiles:
ki^k" M~

a.

The B&B Siding panel truck

b.

1948 Plymouth automobile

c.

1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile

d.

the Mercury automobile.

10.

Plaintiff

is awarded

property the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
11.

Defendant

is awarded

^ ^ > ^ *

im<2*lu^
as her

sole

and

separate

$MM> ^JLot ^
as his

sole

and

separate
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property the tools of his trade that remain in Plaintiff's possession*
12,

Defendant is ordered to pay and assume one-half

of the bills owing to:
3

p^-

a*

Sears

b.

Dr. Regal

c.

payments on the mobile home

d.

personal loan

e.

IRS lien

13.

*^&c.#

^-fJ.-

Each party is ordered

to assume and pay their

respective attorney's fees and costs in maintaining this action.
DATED this

)# day of (XryUcS

, 1983.

BY THE COURT:

/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

HORACE KNOWLTON

Attorney for Defendant
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*
I

I

KENN M. HANSON of and for
CONDER, HANSON, WANGSGARD & BULLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

B

DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

i
i
]i

WILMA R. BUGGER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

i

CHARLES B. BUGGER,

Civil No. D-81-4371

Defendant.
Trial on this matter came on for its regularly scheduled
time on the 19th day of April, 1983/ before the Honorable Dean
Conder, District Court Judge.

Plaintiff appeared personally and

through her attorney, Kenn M* Hanson; Defendant appeared personally
and through his attorney, Horace Knowlton.

The Court heard and

considered the parties1 testimony as proffered by their attorneys
and further considered the evidencef and being fully advised in
the premises

and

good

cause

appearing

thereon, the

Court

now

makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
least three

Both Plaintiff
(3) months

and Defendant

immediately

before

are now and
the

filing

for at
of

this

nm AK

action have been residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

The parties were married on June 10, 1946, in Las

Vegas, Nevada. However, at that time of said marriage Plaintiff's
interlocutory period from a prior divorce had not expired rendering
the marriage ceremony to Defendant void.
3.

7

During

the course of the parties' relationship,

six (R) children were born as issue, all of whom have attained
majority.
4.

During the course of their relationship the parties

acquired real property situat^ at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns,
Utah, consisting of a house and lot.

The fair market value

of

said real property is $47,000.00.
There exists an underlying
real property

in

the amount

of

1st mortgage on said

$5,633.13;

there

exists an

underlying 2nd mortgage on said real property in the amount of
$8,236.10.
Based thereon, total present equity in said real
property amounts to $33,630.77.
5.

During the course of the parties' relationship, the

parties acquired a cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah.
The fair market value of said real property is $550.00.
6.

During the course of the parties' relationship, the

parties acquired a 12' x 60' mobile home.

The fair market value
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of said mobile home is $-?-rO00.00.
7.

During

their

relationship

the parties

acquired

certain vehicles described as follows with corresponding values:
a. 1975 Cadillac automobile

$

5,000.00

b. Mercury automobile

100.00

c. Panel truck

1,000.00

d. 1948 Plymouth

50.00

e. 1965 Pontiac

50.00

8.

During the course of the relationship, the parties

acquired the proceeds of a Uniform Real Estate

Contract

on a

principal sum of $7,800.00 at 9% interest per annum for 15 years
paying $79.11 per month.

Said contract has 9 years on its terms

and the present value of said note is $6,000.00.
9.

*?/od<

During the course of the relationship, the Defendant

acquired tools of his trade which have a present value of $1,700.00. fla
10*

During the course of the relationship, the parties

incurred various obligations set forth below with corresponding
balances which have been paid by Plaintiff:
a.

Sears

b.

Dr. Regal

c.

Mobile Home

d.

Credit Union

e.

IRS lien

$

423.00
50.00

1,500.00
744.00
2,650.00
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J^pe^

/ti/ldUirf't

/jui^fM

0)Tt$

11.

During the course of the relationship, the Defendant

incurred certain debts in the name of his businesf B&B Siding, as
follows:
a.

Century Finance*' Company;

b.

Valley Bank & Trust; and

c.

VISA.

12.

/0f40.4£

tfui*.

&O,\A .

£? />d.

It is fair and reasonable that the real property

located at 4098 W. 5500

Southf

Kearns, Utah, be awarded

to

Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff assuming and paying the underlying
1st and

2nd mortgages

thereon,

and,

further,

subject

to an

equitable lien in favor of Defendant in the amount of $9,796.00.
13.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff pay to

Defendant the equitable lien as follows:
a.

Plaintiff shall have 180 days from entry of the

Decree to pay to Defendant the amount of $9,796.00.
b.

In the event

Plaintiff

has

not paid

Defendant

$9/796.00 upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the
Decree, said amount of Defendant's lien shall accrue interest on
the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid.
c.
entry of

Further, upon the expiration of 180 days from the

the Decree and

in the event Plaintiff has not paid

Defendant the amount of Defendant's lien, the above-referenced
real property shall be listed for sale through a multiple listing
agency and sold for the best price.
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14.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded

as his sole and separate property the cabin lot located in Duchesne
County, Utah,

subject

to any and all underlying

obligations

thereon,
15.
as his sole

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded
and separate property the 12' x 60' mobile home

subject to any and all underlying obligations thereon.
16.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded

as his sole and separate property the proceeds of a Uniform Real
Estate Contract amounting to $79.11 per month until said payments/^<fo^
terminate according to the terms and provisions of said contract.
17.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded

as her sole and separate property the fixtures, furniture and
personalty located within the real property at 4098 West 5500
South, R e a m s , Utah.
18.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be ordered

to assume and pay, holding Plaintiff harmless from any liability
thereon, the debts

and

obligations

arising

from

Defendant's

company known as B&B Siding Co., listed as follows:
a.

Century Finance

b.

Valley Bank & Trust

c.

VISA

19.

^3 W *
*3~fzd*

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded

00H9

as his sole and separate property the proceeds from the sale of
the following automobiles:
/a.

The B&B Siding panel truck

b.

1948 Plymouth automobile

c.

1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile
the Mercury automobile.

U^J^

20.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded

as her sole and separate property the 1975 Cadillac automobile.
V^

21.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded

his sole and separate property the tools of his trade that
remain in Plaintiff's possession.
22.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be ordered

to pay and assume one-half of the bills owing to:
^

JpL

a.

Sears

b.

Dr. Regal 7

c.

payments on the mobile home

d.

personal loan

e.

IRS lien

23.

It

^PjljL*
^f^L^

is fair and

reasonable

that each party

be

ordered to assume and pay their respective attorney's fees and
costs in maintaining this action.
WHEREFORE, the

Court,

having

made

and

entered

the

foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the following:

-6« f» C\

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and

subject matter of this action.
2.

There exists grounds legally sufficient to grant a

Decree of Annulment declaring said marriage to be void ab initio.
3.

There exists legally insufficient grounds to award

attorney's fees to either party.
4.

The Decree of Annulment should be in conformance

with the foregoing Findings of Fact.

DATED this

Wl

day of

/fylt4/

, 1983,

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

HORACE KNOWLTON
Attorney for Defendant
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HOME:
F a i r Market V a l u e
1 s t mortgage: $ 5 , 6 3 3 . 1 3
2nd mortgage: $ 8 , 2 3 6 . 0 0

$

TOTAL EQUITY:

$

33,630.77

$

33,630.00
5,000.00

PLAINTIFF'S EQUITY:
a.
Real p r o p e r t y
b.
Cadillac

47,500.00
-13,869.23

Plaintiff's GROSS equity:
LESS Defendant's lien:

$ 38,630.00
9,796.00

PLAINTIFF'S NET EQUITY:

$

28,834.00

$

550.00
6,000.00
7,000.00
2,688.00
1,700.00
1,100.00

Defendant's GROSS equity:
PLUS Defendant's lien:

$

19,038.00
9,796.00

DEFENDANT'S TOTAL EQUITY

$

28,834.00

$

38,630.00
-19,038.00

DEFENDANT'S EQUITY:
a. Duchesne property
b. UREC
c. Trailer
d. 1/2 of debts
e. Defendant's tools
g. Car proceeds

COMPUTATION OF DEFENDANT'S LIEN:
Plaintiff's GROSS equity:
Less Defendant's GROSS equity:

Difference
$ 19,592.00
$19,592.00 diyided by 2 = $9,796.00( Defendant's lien)

nni52

